M. Buroway, Manufacturing Consent. University of Chicago Press, 1979, 33-35; 46-73

Paper by Keith Rollag on this Article

Summary

This chapter chronicles Buroway's experience as a machine tool operator in a small parts shop of a big manufacturing company. Buroway compared and contrasted the shop floor culture of his "work study" against similar observations by Donald Roy, another researcher who wrote about his similar job at the same company 30 years earlier.

Buroway's findings demonstrate a situation where the piece-wise compensation system caused an informal structure and culture to evolve on the shop floor that was in many ways counter to the formal company procedures. In effect, the shop floor behaved as a natural system totally unlike the rational system found in company records -- yet the parts were still made, and the work was still done.

In the past 30 years the worker-management relationship had improved through increased operator autonomy and reduced conflict (via job transfers), tensions between operators had increased. The reduction of operator support staff on the shop floor, coupled with the piece-wise rate system, forced operators to increasingly compete with each other for scarce resources.

The informal culture had evolved into a game of "making out", where operators engaged in a bizarre "dance" with supervisors, inspectors, and support staff to bend or break the rules to maximize their individual profits, often at the expense of quality.

From Geer Company to Allied Corporation

The author worked as a machine operator at so-called Allied Corporation. This was the same plant that another researcher Donald Roy worked at 30 years earlier and wrote a doctoral dissertation about. In Roy's time, he concluded that the divergent normative systems and relationships between "bosses" and "yardbirds (workers)" caused much of the restriction felt by the laborers. He felt that the workers needed to become "first-class citizens" before much productivity gains could be realized.

Roy's analysis was from a closed system perspective, and restricted to second shift. Buroway researched Roy's work and interviewed retired managers from the era, and analyzed company management records.

Geer company was a engine manufacturer that prospered during WWII, with over 4000 emplyees at war's end. Machine tool companies provide a good stable technology that hasn't changed much over the years (except recent changed in computer controlled machines) making them a good place to study the "non-technical" sources of change in the organization of work.

At Allied, the machine operators worked on a piece-rate system that paid more if the operator made more pieces than expected (at 100%, 125% and max 140% production rate levels). In 1945 the workers were basically "paid by the piece" made, they increased their wages by bargaining for higher minimum rates or with the time-study people to raise labor rates for particular operations. Now the union shop negotiates for higher rates at each labor grade.

Furthermore, in 1945 labor disputes were on the shop floor, now there are in the conference room. Conflicts on the floor in 1945 were difficult to resolve, now job transfers provide a "relief valve" that has reduced management-worker conflict and promoted individualism.

Since the parts shop work structure and pay is based on a rate set by the production level and type of procedure, operator work has evolved into a game of "making out".

Operators get their daily orders from "schedule men", and then get setup parts from the crib attendant and materials from the truck driver. After setup the first part must be inspected by the inspector. Highly productive (and hence high wage ) work requires consitent and timely assitance from these support people.

The nature of the rate rules affects how hard people work. The operators and supervisors bend the rules to ensure they recieve the highest wage possible each day. Extra work on one day is carried over as a "kitty" to other days. The game results because there are easy and difficult jobs (depending on the wage rate vs is actual complexity). Some jobs are hard to "make out", and some jobs are easy. Smart operators learn to "work the system".

The limited number of support people on second shift always causes problems and delays. Interestingly, this system doesn't promote much worker solidarity, because they are paid based on the rate of individual labor. Given the scarcity of support help, the best wages go to those to individually build good relationships with supervisors and support people.

The work culture revolves around similar operations. Operators on certain machines usually eat together. The shop floor culture revolves around making-out. After a while the author began to master the game and became absorbed by the strategies. Making out provided a basis for hierarchies on the shop floor. People liked or disliked people by how they helped them "make out".

Marx obseved that the piece wage system "tends to develop on the one hand that individuality, and with it the sense of liberty, independence, and self-control of the laborers, on the other, thier competition with one another." But the reliance of suport people (with different motivators) on the shop floor can lead to conflict. Usually there wasn't enough support people to keep things moving smoothly, building pressure and rivalry among operators as they competed for scarce resources.

The interactions between managment and workers are more difficult. In one instance, the addition of new technology created tension between some layers of management who wanted the new technology quickly integrated into production, and other layers and workers that didn't understand the new technology or how to make it work.

But, in general, since 1945 the conflicts between labor and management had gone down, while the conflict among workers had gone up. This was because in 1945 there were more support workers, and more hostility to the penny-pinching practices of management then. The "new"company Allied treated the workers more fairly than the old company.

In conclusion, there was more individual control in Allied over Geer because of less managerial control, less inspection of pieces and rate-fixing, increased bargaining between operators and foremen, and changes in the system of piece rates that put more emphasis on personal labor and initiative.

The study shows how workers can "self-organize" and ignore/alter the rules to pursue individual goals (making out and making as much money as possible). In fact, much of their organization and culture was at odds with management's intentions.

It is an example of how the structure and norms "on paper" may not correspond at all with the actual behaviors of the participants. The rational system is subverted by the natural system (and yet the parts still get made, and work gets done).