BAB019
9/9/99
WFNX-101.7 FM and Boston’s Radio Wars
The Risk of Success
Kurt St. Thomas, the program director of WFNX radio looked out at a raucous crowd of over 100,000 people on Boston's Esplanade as he waited for the band Green Day to take the stage on Sept. 9, 1994. This show was part of the station’s: “Disorientation: Welcome Back To School” weekend. At that moment, the show seemed to be the station's crowning achievement.
“We were putting on the biggest concert in Boston. We had really done something. We'd impacted in some kind of way we hadn't before,” said St. Thomas, looking back on the show. “We upstaged every other radio station in Boston. I didn't want the rest of the world to know about this [music]. I didn't want everyone jumping on the bandwagon. But I knew it was too late. We were in big (expletive) trouble. “
St. Thomas's feeling turned out to be prophetic. This little 3,000-watt station from Lynn, Mass. was about to make a difference. The Green Day concert exploded that day into what the newspapers would later call a “melee.” Some of the fans erupted in hysteria as the state police stopped the concert halfway through Green Day's sixth song. In a call to rebel against authority, lead singer Billy Joe had urged the crowd to destroy the surrounding property on the Esplanade. “Pull up the (expletive) flowers,” he screamed from the stage. The police fought for hours in the rain to restore order and regain control.
Media attention focused on the event for weeks. CNN and MTV carried the story for days, and local newspapers and television questioned the need for free rock concerts on the Esplanade. But whether or not there would be free concerts, nothing would ever be the same for WFNX.
The Birth of a Station
WFNX - 101.7 FM was started in 1983 by The Phoenix Media/Communications Group, a local media conglomerate. Founded in 1966, the company was known for its flagship newspaper, The Boston Phoenix, which became the largest alternative weekly in New England and the second-largest in the country.
The initial mission of WFNX was to serve as a link to the newspaper, appealing to the same audience: educated, affluent, single professionals and students seeking different opinions from those offered by mainstream media. That counter-culture role spurred WFNX to choose the emerging sound known as “new wave” or “alternative” music as its format. No other station in the area was playing similar music. Only one other station in the country, KROQ in Los Angeles, featured “new wave” at the time. The first song to hit the airwaves when WFNX went on the air was “Video Killed The Radio Star” by the Buggles. WFNX focused on bands like Sex Pistols, Missing Persons, Talking Heads and Devo, while mixing in local music, jazz and reggae.
Over the years, WFNX gained a following as the “cool” radio station. It offered something different from the hard-rock music heard on other stations. It also maintained a firm commitment to the local music scene and supported bands like the Mighty Mighty Bosstones, when no other station would.
The WFNX staff had an ear for discovering new national music. The station started throwing parties at local clubs, bringing in new, relatively unknown bands like Nirvana and Smashing Pumpkins, which went on to become hugely popular. WFNX established itself as the leader in new music. It became the station to listen to, for those who wanted to hear “the next big thing” before anyone else.
But while the station wanted to stay outside the mainstream, it was also driven to succeed in an industry where competition could be brutal. WFNX was discovering that it was one thing to establish an identity. It was another to defend it in the commercial world of radio. (See Appendices A-D for background data on WFNX ratings, demographics and revenue trends).
The Role of Radio
Since the 1930s, radio played an important part in the value chain of the music industry and in the media mixes of advertisers. Radio was the music industry's “sampling vehicle.” While it was possible to promote an unknown talent via clubs and word of mouth, it was virtually impossible for an “underground” artist to become a major act without the support of radio airplay. Stardom came to depend on radio.
“People did not buy pop music they had never heard. But it was axiomatic that for each single in the top ten, you could sell a million albums. So promotion, the art and science of getting songs on the air, drove the record business. Not marketing, because no amount of advertising or even good reviews and publicity were enough to sell millions of albums. Not sales, because record stores only reacted to demand and did not create it. Even the best A&R (artist and repertoire) staff in the world couldn't save you if radio gave you the cold shoulder.” [1]
Record companies grew to include marketing, sales and promotion staff. In the 1970s, independent promoters also became a powerful force. Radio program directors were bombarded with offerings from both established and new artists. There was more new product than there were airplay slots to fill. In this competitive environment, it became a struggle to land a place on a station's playlist. Competition gave rise to abuses like bribery. The “payola” scandals of the early 1960s brought the “pay-for-play” practice to light, and prompted a law enforcement crackdown.
For the advertiser aiming to create awareness and a brand image, radio was an important element in an overall media mix. Radio's strength was that individual stations could target specific demographic groups. Airtime was relatively cheap, allowing advertisers to add higher levels of frequency, or repeated ads, to their media plans. Radio was considered more intimate, personal and imaginative than other media was, but it was useless whenever displays or product demonstrations were required. [2]
Radio was also an excellent medium for local and regional advertisers, because of broadcast range and cost. It was useful for national advertisers, but it required stations in enough markets to conduct a truly national campaign. Consolidation of the radio industry, described later in this case, reduced the administrative burden on the media buyer, making radio potentially even stronger as a media vehicle.
Radio Economics: WFNX vs. Others
Radio stations had much in common with other businesses when it came to financial statements (see Exhibit 1). But they also had to contend with special expenses, while benefiting from unique revenue opportunities. Primary revenue generation came from selling time slots or advertising “spots.” The cost of spots varied with each radio station, primarily based on ratings and signal strength. For example, a one-minute spot in prime time (Monday - Friday, 6 a.m. - 10 a.m.) cost approximately $650-700 at Boston radio station WBCN, which was WFNX's biggest competitor. A comparable spot on WFNX cost $100-250.
Radio was considered more effective than magazines, newspapers or television as a media buy, with a cost per thousand (CPM) in audience exposure of $40-50. An average radio station had approximately 500,000 listeners per week. Advertisers could run an ad 40 times on a radio station, compared with buying a one-quarter page ad in The Boston Sunday Globe, for example, at the same cost. Since audiences responded to repeated messages, radio was the perfect medium for capitalizing on advertisers' frequency needs. People listened to radio in their cars, at work or at home throughout the day.
Generally, staffing was the biggest expense for radio stations due to high talent costs. Howard Stern, the syndicated “shock jock,” was WBCN's morning drive-time personality. Stern cost the station about $500,000 in annual syndication fees. By contrast, WFNX spent relatively modest sums on talent and was able to hire DJs at nearly half the market rate, because the station was seen as the “hip” place to work. [3]
“Money is tight for us, but not an obstacle. We're still profitable, so if we felt that spending $200,000 on high-priced talent would give us X% increase in ratings, then we would do it,” said WFNX station manager Andy Kingston. “Because Tai (a former WFNX DJ) was in the mornings for so long, we never thought about it. Also in the early days, WFNX was the only station playing alternative music, so there was no need to pay a lot. Now that the format has become popular, major companies are throwing a ton of money at talent. So, the economics has started to change.”
Radio stations also faced the expense of annual licensing fees from companies and publishers' associations such as BMI, ASCAP and SESAC, which represented the rights of musical artists. These groups assigned a percentage of copyright fees to be paid by all stations, based on their gross revenues. WFNX's annual percentage was 1.62% for ASCAP and BMI and 0.75% for SESAC.
Marketing also represented a major cost for typical radio stations. WMJX-Magic 106.7, for example, spent roughly $2 million annually on television, print and billboard advertising. Other Boston stations like JAMN 94.5, WBMX-MIX 98.5 and WXKS-KISS 108 also spent a significant amount on marketing. But neither WFNX nor WBCN advertised on television or billboards, so their marketing expenses were substantially lower than those of competitors.
The Ratings Game
By the time of the Green Day concert, WFNX had established itself as the young, cool station. But it still had to contend with a ratings system in order to achieve financial success.
The system devised by a company called Arbitron was based on diaries, which were randomly mailed to listeners in a local market four times a year. The “diary keepers” were asked to write down when, where and what station they listened to during a one-week period. The diaries were then compiled, so that Arbitron could calculate numbers for each radio station, charting each hour of the day by age group. In the Boston market, the numbers ranged from 0.0 to 9.9.[4] Station managers and advertisers used the data to evaluate the audience for each station. The Arbitron ratings were indicators of a station's market share. It was estimated that a one-point increase in ratings represented about $1 million in profit.[5]
The Arbitron ratings had long been a sore spot for WFNX. Until the Green Day concert, the station had never gone above an average yearly share of 2.0, even though thousands of people attended its concerts and heard its broadcasts in Boston-area stores. One of the main reasons for the low ratings was the station's signal, which was limited to 3,000 watts in an area dominated by 50,000-watt stations like WBCN, KISS and JAMN. The station made several modifications to improve the signal, within the bounds of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) rules. WFNX turned its antenna to reach more of the greater Boston area and then moved to a tower nearer Boston. Both of these changes made an impact, but there were still many areas that could not receive WFNX clearly. Other possible explanations for low ratings were inadequate marketing or music that was just “too weird” for the general population. WFNX management dismissed both of these ideas.
The Green Day Aftermath - The War Begins
WFNX's main competitor was WBCN 104.1 FM, a station with a traditional rock format, playing bands like Aerosmith, Van Halen and Metallica. WBCN was owned by Infinity, a national radio group. Although there had been some rivalry between the two stations over the years, it had been minimal before the Green Day concert and did not greatly concern WFNX. But after the concert, the situation changed. WBCN began introducing more “alternative” music into its format. WBCN had previously played one or two alternative songs per hour. But soon after the show, it began playing three and then four per hour. Other stations also started picking up on alternative. “The Monday after the Green Day show, KISS 108 added Green Day's ‘Dookie’ to their playlist,” said Kurt St. Thomas. “It was mind-blowing.”
Table A
WBCN Partial Song
List:
Before/After Format Switch
|
AFTER
April 17-23 1995
|
||
Artist |
Song |
Artist |
Song |
|
Stone Temple Pilots |
Plush |
Mad Season |
River of Deceit |
|
Soul Asylum |
Runaway Train |
Better than Ezra |
Good |
|
Screaming Trees |
Dollar Bill |
Bush |
Little Things |
|
Porno for Pyros |
Pets |
Matthew Sweet |
Sick of Myself |
|
Aerosmith |
Cryin’ |
Juliana Hatfield |
Universal Heartbeat |
|
Steve Miller Band |
Wide River |
Green Day |
She |
|
Lenny Kravitz |
Believe |
Jeff Buckley |
Last Goodbye |
|
Pat Benair |
Everybody Lay Down |
White Zombie |
More Human than Human |
|
AC/DC |
Big Gun |
Live |
All Over You |
|
Queensryche |
Real World |
Stone Temple Pilots |
Dancing Days |
|
The Odds |
Heterosexual Man |
The Dave Matthews Band |
What Would You Say |
|
Robert Plant |
Palms |
Offspring |
Kick Him When He’s Down |
|
Pete Townshend |
English Boy |
General Public |
Rainy Days |
|
Ozzy Osbourne |
Changes |
RadioHead |
Fake Plastic Trees |
|
Donald Fagen |
Tomorrow’s Girls |
Grant Lee Buffalo |
Honey Don’t Think |
|
Peter Gabriel |
Secret World |
Nine Inch Nails |
Hurt |
|
Brother Cane |
Got No Shame |
Our Lady Peace |
Starseed |
|
Neil Young |
Long May You Run |
Pearl Jam |
Not for You |
|
Sting |
Fields of Gold |
Stone Temple Pilots |
Pretty Penny |
|
Anthrax |
Only |
Oasis |
Live Forever |
Source:
Jim Sullivan, “Reinventing the Rock of Boston”, The Boston Globe, May 5, 1995,
57.
Boston's radio battle over alternative music reached its peak in the late spring of 1995, when The Boston Globe featured two extensive articles on the topic, written by rock critic Jim Sullivan.[6] The stories documented the growth of a younger, more edgy, less commercial “alternative” or “modern rock” sound that was growing in popularity. WFNX was cited as an avatar of this trend. In 1994, it had been named “Alternative Station of the Year” by two trade magazines, The Gavin Report and CMJ. At the time of these articles, large-share Boston stations such as WBCN and WAAF were already mixing alternative artists into their playlists (see Table A).
WBCN admitted that its current format, known as album-oriented rock (AOR), was “dead.” Although it had actually moved slowly to adopt “modern,” WBCN's program director, Oedipus, was portraying the station's move in the press as being current with the trends. Some industry pundits like music trade magazine editor Mike Boyle agreed that WBCN was “ahead of the curve.” But most observers recognized that WBCN had arrived late to the party and was taking its programming lead from the much smaller WFNX. “WBCN has waddled into alternative with a rock mentality,” said Dave Mac, an editor at Hard Report. “There’s more shared music between these types of stations; ’BCN is playing some of the same stuff as ’FNX.”[7]
The critics clearly credited WFNX with leading the trend.
“WFNX has not attracted big ratings but it has made a lot of noise, arranging for mega-concerts of leading alternative bands such as the one last Wednesday on Lansdowne Street, and getting known as the commercial station closest to the mythical ‘street,’” the Globe's Jim Sullivan said. Patrick Lyons, owner of several Lansdowne Street clubs, agreed. “You can't buy ‘street.’” They [WBCN] have to regain their credibility,” he said. Speaking to the press, Oedipus was dismissive of WFNX, saying that it appealed only to a cult audience. “Aside from a lack of power, we're broadcasters and they're primarily a newspaper station. They’re an audio magazine. I don’t respond to somebody with a 2.0 share,” said the WBCN program director. [8]
WFNX also saw the issue as one of identity, but it stressed commitment. “I'm skeptical of their credibility in this area,” said Kurt St. Thomas, speaking of WBCN. “They can sleep for ten years and suddenly wake up and realize what’s going on?”[9] What about the two-share? “There’s a point where we’ll peak. It’s not the mission of the station to be a six-share like KISS-108. We’re a niche marketed radio station.”[10]
The crossfire between the WFNX and WBCN program directors was more than just one of mutual put-downs. Each had put his finger on the critical issues that shaped the identities of the two stations and would drive their competition. While WBCN pretended it was too big to care about a smaller station, it was worried that WFNX would capture the growth of a new audience. The two stations were actually more alike than either acknowledged. The big difference was time.
As a station that started in the mid-1960s, WBCN had also risen through the decades from a small station that played the counter-culture music of its era to become an established success. Much of its music, like its listeners, had grown older. Just as WBCN had once threatened the other, more traditional stations, it was now being threatened by WFNX.
WFNX identified with its smaller share, taking it as a sign that it was in touch with its progressive audience. If St. Thomas was to be believed, the station did not want to be as big as KISS-108. That kind of mass appeal could only adulterate its identification with its real audience. Was the problem one of contradiction? Or could the station succeed by staying small? The message of its music also implied a conflict. Groups like Green Day were hostile toward traditional commercial values and even destructive of property. Could the station promote music with an anti-establishment message and still be a commercial success? Long commercial breaks might pump up the station's revenues, but would they also turn off the station's core audience? Gaining revenues might mean losing identity, and vice versa. Where was the balance? Was there one? Or, was it a strategic trap?
WBCN's attempt to label WFNX as a “newspaper station” or an “audio magazine” also hurt, but it raised significant issues. If WFNX was a link to The Phoenix, the station may have played a similar role to the weekly newspaper. But it was in a different media context. The Phoenix made its own mark in the 1960s by covering issues that were largely neglected by the Globe. The market niche existed thanks to the Globe's market dominance. But the radio dial was far more diverse, with a host of commercial rock stations, as well as college stations that appealed to some of the same new-music audiences. Differentiation in radio might mean filling a smaller niche than the one that was available to The Phoenix. WFNX seemed to be driving the music scene when it was small and when it was defining itself. Once other stations like WBCN began to respond to the threat, they also started to define WFNX.
Defending the Turf
The alternative sound was clearly growing. The larger-share stations like WAAF and WBCN faced the task of making the transition to “modern,” while still not turning off a mass market audience. WAAF claimed that it had been “blending” formats for years. “As rock has moved in certain directions, we've moved in those directions,” said WAAF's general manager, Bruce Mittman. “We have solid, good, guitar-driven alternative songs.” Mittman said that music was difficult to categorize, but he conceded that WAAF's playlist was probably 35-40% alternative. WBCN, whose sound had clearly aged along with its listeners, was also engineering a blend. The changeover would pose a problem for WBCN which, along with many other stations, relied on demographics between the wage-earning ages of 25 and 54. A more “modern” sound would be taking their demographics down into the 18-34 range. For 'BCN the decision was made much easier by parent Infinity's purchase of WZLX, a “classic rock” station. The move allowed the parent company to split its formats and cover the entire rock age range.
While other stations were discovering alternative music, rumors were rampant that a 50,000-watt station in the market was going to “flip” to playing alternative music exclusively, just like WFNX. The possibilities included WCGY, another traditional rock station. As the rumors became stronger, WFNX learned that WCGY had done a full analysis of an alternative music format and had determined it was not economically viable. The management at WFNX took comfort in the decision.
“I was pushing senior management to buy more vans and to do a heavy street push to make sure we maintained our position, but they were just cocky,” said St. Thomas. “The president of the company would announce at every Monday radio meeting that “no one can afford to duplicate our format.”
By May 1995, WBCN had completely switched to an alternative music format. But WFNX management continued to see the bright side. “I guess I was a little relieved that it was WBCN who switched, as opposed to someone else. I knew that in order to support a station of that size, they couldn't undercut our prices with advertisers,” said Andy Kingston, station manager at WFNX. “If someone was going to come at us, this was the best of the possibilities.”
Stephen Mindich, chairman of The Phoenix Media/Communications Group, was also confident that WFNX would hold its ground, despite WBCN's switch.
“I didn't think it would be damaging to us,” he said. “WFNX didn't skyrocket after the Green Day concert, and I didn't think alternative would be a strong enough format for them [WBCN]. They had a traditional, winning format so why switch? I felt that it would not sustain their long-term audience, but would increase the appeal of the music so we would get some benefit and recognition as the station who played this music first.”
The Competition Intensifies
But WBCN's switch to an alternative station included more than simply playing the music WFNX was playing. WBCN registered with Monitor, which was Billboard magazine's industry report on radio stations and their formats. There were several damaging aspects for WFNX.
“When a station changes their reporting status in Monitor, it's a big deal,” said St. Thomas. “The problem for WFNX was that Monitor only reports the top 15 stations in a market based on Arbitron ratings, so WBCN was now listed as the alternative station in Boston, even though they had just switched formats.”
“WFNX, the heritage alternative station in Boston, wasn't even listed anymore. I knew this was going to hurt us in the industry down the line,” he said.
As larger stations began to switch formats, WFNX found it harder to get the bands for its free shows. Record companies that had previously supported WFNX and provided it with the hottest bands now felt an obligation to stations like WBCN, which were far more powerful in signal and influence.
Some record companies also started packaging non-alternative bands like Alanis Morissette and Bush as “alternative,” hoping to capture a larger share of the market. Even though these bands were not part of WFNX's “sound,” it became a question of playing these groups or losing the chance to get the artists that the station really wanted. WFNX wouldn't compromise. To make matters worse, record companies would sometimes ignore WFNX altogether in providing bands for concerts. The station's retaliation was to stop playing groups from those labels. Relationships between WFNX and some labels became strained.
Radio Anarchy: The Rise and Fall
In July 1995, after eight years with WFNX, St. Thomas left to work for Arista Records in New York. WFNX promoted one program director (PD) after another from within the station's ranks, but the moves were not successful. Some DJ's also left for other Boston stations. Particularly troubling were the losses of afternoon DJ Neal Robert who moved to WBCN and the morning show host, Tai, who left to pursue a talk radio career on WRKO-AM. It was a time of drift.
Unable to find a suitable leader inside the station, WFNX management brought in a new PD in July 1996. In September, the station launched a promotion called “Radio Anarchy” in an effort to stop its slide in the ratings. (See Exhibit 2 for a ratings comparison.) The Radio Anarchy push was meant to raise awareness and distinguish WFNX from other stations. The concept and the name were tested in a few focus groups of both WFNX and WBCN “core” listeners (those who listen to a station virtually exclusively). Occasional (or “cume”) listeners were also tested. The name and the concept both registered well.
But within a month of the rollout, the station started getting negative feedback. People were not responding, and many seemed to feel that WFNX did not deliver on its promise of what Radio Anarchy was supposed to be.
“There were no focus groups, no real discussion, no testing of it in print sizes. This was not thought through enough,” said Kelly Graml, the station’s marketing director. “The PD came in and wanted to make a big splash and had a lot of experience in promotions. So, everyone at the station got behind him on this. Also, we had nothing as far as a promotional message going into the fall, and people were uptight. The problem is that we tried to launch this in a month with a brand new PD who had not assimilated to the station with an understanding of its resources. This kind of process should be done over four to six months...”
“Even if Radio Anarchy was a good idea, the process was so flawed that we didn't have time to know. My biggest concern was that we could run the risk of hurting the station,” said Graml.
Stephen Mindich, the group's chairman, had decided to go ahead with Radio Anarchy, in spite of misgivings. When the idea failed, he was left searching for answers.
“I never liked the word, but a lot of people felt it had merit, and we had hired a PD who created this concept, which we thought could be done. I think one of the problems was that the music was not at the center of the promotion,” Mindich said.
“Also, after watching the ratings slip consistently despite the fact that we had always been viewed as the “real” alternative station and WBCN was the “phony” in all the earlier focus groups we did, I decided to defer my judgment to others who should know more about this than myself and go with Anarchy, which was far different from anything we had done before.”
By April 1997, management decided that Radio Anarchy was not living up to expectations. But the new PD was having trouble letting go of the concept, and it was later suspected that the PD was not following some of the music test results. [11] “Radio Anarchy died a slow, painful death. And because the PD still liked it, we had trouble getting a consensus on what to do next,” Graml said. WFNX finally pulled the plug on Radio Anarchy on June 26, 1997. The PD resigned in August.
WFNX had now gone through three program directors in two years. The frequent changes were demoralizing. The station lacked direction, and it was still suffering from a steady drop in ratings. Staff turnover increased as many sales reps left to join WBCN. WFNX suffered a 100% turnover in sales staff in 1996, and a 75% turnover in 1997. The remaining staff worried that they were losing everything good about the station.
The Industry Consolidates
While WFNX was facing both internal and external troubles, consolidation was reshaping the entire radio industry. (Exhibits 3 and 4 summarize the changes in radio station ownership between August 1994 and August 1997. Exhibit 5 shows the evolution of the Boston radio market over 10 years.)
In September 1997, CBS bought American Radio Systems, increasing its number of Boston stations to six.[12] CBS had already acquired Infinity, WBCN's parent company. The new deal would take effect by early-to-mid 1998. But under FCC rules, CBS could only own five FM stations and four AM stations in a major market. The Federal Trade Commission only allowed a maximum 40% market share by one company. CBS would have to drop two or more stations to stay below the 40% line in Boston.
It was unclear how CBS would meet these requirements, because the merger would make WBCN and WAAF part of the same group. The outcome was important because WBCN had recently focused more of its competitive attention on WAAF and less on WFNX. WBCN was concerned about WAAF because it was classified as an “active rock” station, a format that was becoming a significant force across the country.[13] In a recent Boston Arbitron ratings book, WAAF had beaten WBCN in all “dayparts” except for morning drive time. There were three rumors on what CBS would do, if and when the merger was approved. It could sell WAAF outright; it could keep WAAF but try to convince the FCC and FTC that it was purely a Worcester station; or CBS could donate WAAF to Nash Broadcasting, a minority-owned radio group, which would convert the station to an urban format. This last move would have reflected positively on CBS, because the FCC was encouraging more minority-run radio stations.
Regardless of how CBS chose to handle the merger, the fallout from industry-wide consolidation would be significant for independent radio stations like WFNX. Aside from concerns that mergers could create a “Big Brother” that would control what the public heard, they also brought together huge sales forces with the ability to offer radio time buys on all of a group’s stations at a discount. The advantage was that national advertisers could reach a wider audience in the same market at a low cost. The disadvantage was that the buyer might ignore the benefits of other radio stations and potentially miss a target market.
Challenge for the Future
WFNX was struggling with the question of what to do next.
“We have to focus on who we are,” said Kelly Graml. “We need another vehicle to hit the streets, more grass-roots marketing to get the station to reach the people and to market what we have to offer.”
“There is no question that the consolidation is a huge concern. But I think everyone at the station is realizing that there needs to be a complete strategy. This past year showed us what happens when there's no strategy,” she said. “There are so many things we should be looking at.” (See Exhibit 6 for strategic options.)
The station was changing tactics. In addition to putting more effort into marketing, it began playing more hits and fewer new artists. When it did play new sounds, it played them more often in an effort to “own” the group. But Stephen Mindich disputed the idea that WFNX was turning into a hit station.
“We are not shifting to playing just hits,” he said. “We are maintaining the tradition of 'FNX's music. I believe, as does the research company we consult, that the newer music we were playing was not as good as the older music. And since people want to hear what they know, we have to make some accommodations. In comparison to other stations, we play the hits far less frequently.”
In order to maintain its image as a showcase for new sounds, the station launched a campaign called “What the Future Sounds Like.” It also created “'FNX Interactive,” which gave listeners a link to the station through the Internet.
In November 1997, a new program director, Cruze, was hired to bring WFNX back on track with a clear direction and purpose. Cruze planned to capitalize on the traditional position of the station while continuing to play a mix of both new and recognizable alternative music.
“When I got here, I was pleased that the station and the public had not lost the sense that we are the real alternative station in the market,” Cruze said. “The good thing is that if you ask 100 people in a room what music WFNX plays, everyone will say alternative. The bad thing we're facing is that if you ask those same people what station they should listen to, most will say WBCN. We have to convince, or re-convince them, that this is the best place to find alternative music; that's why we decided add the slogan, “Boston's Real Alternative.””
Cruze also turned his attention to the DJ line up and match-ups against WBCN. The toughest problem was the morning show.
“Unfortunately, there is no template for a successful, alternative music, morning show. We can't compete with Howard Stern head-on. We need something totally different, but the talent pool is small,” he said. “Trying to get something to work is an excruciating process.” The strategy for other time slots seemed clearer.
“In the afternoon, Nik Carter (on WBCN) plays half the records we do, since WBCN is trying to maintain a hip, funny, wordy show. We counter that by playing more music and making sure that when WBCN is playing commercials we are playing music. This way, if people are punching back and forth between stations, when they land on us they'll usually hear music. Since playing the best music around is what we're about, it just makes sense.”
Decision Time Arrives
In 1995, the Globe's Jim Sullivan had called WFNX “the Boston area's long-term commercial alternative-music outlet.”[14] He cited five straight Arbitron rating periods of improving numbers, from a 2.1 to a 2.5 share. Four years later, the format pioneered by WFNX had become dominant, but the station in 1998 found its historical 2.0 market share in jeopardy. The company had done serious thinking, which had produced some promising alternatives to rebuild its share-of-audience. Now it was up to the management at the Phoenix Media/Communications Group and WFNX to sift through the options, determine whether these covered the entire range of possibilities and move quickly before the station lost more ground to competitors.
Appendix
A
Arbitron
Ratings Sample
Morning Drive
Arbitron
– Boston
Demo:
Persons 18-34
Day
part: M – F 6:00am – 10:00am
|
Station |
WI97 |
SP97 |
SU97 |
FA97 |
|
WFNX-FM
AQH Share Cume Pers (00) |
4.5 783 |
3.5 549 |
2.5 566 |
2.9 550 |
|
WBCN-FM AQH Share Cume Pers (00) |
14.1 1680 |
20 2214 |
16.4 1844 |
16.6 1917 |
|
WXKS-FM AQH Share Cume Pers (00) |
10.6 1904 |
12.7 2027 |
11.8 1983 |
11.6 1863 |
|
WJMN-FM AQH Share Cume Pers (00) |
7.5 1399 |
7.3 1449 |
7.1 1340 |
8.3 1522 |
|
WBZ-AM AQH Share Cume Pers (00) |
3.4 644 |
3 622 |
2.7 542 |
4.1 704 |
|
WEGQ-FM AQH Share Cume Pers (00) |
2.7 581 |
3.5 764 |
3.9 779 |
3.8 688 |
|
WZLX-FM AQH Share Cume Pers (00) |
4.1 763 |
3.5 662 |
3.6 676 |
3.4 554 |
|
WBOS-FM AQH Share Cume Pers (00) |
4.8 1066 |
4.6 1011 |
4.5 1082 |
2.6 901 |
|
WROR-FM AQH Share Cume Pers (00) |
2.9 424 |
1.8 359 |
1.5 272 |
2.3 353 |
|
WAAF-FM AQH Share Cume Pers (00) |
5 771 |
5.7 866 |
6.1 901 |
5.6 791 |
|
WEEI-AM AQH Share Cume Pers (00) |
3.1 492 |
1.9 270 |
1.6 283 |
1.4 256 |
|
WCRB-FM AQH Share Cume Pers (00) |
1.7 333 |
0.8 228 |
0.8 218 |
1 253 |
AQH = Average Quarter Hour
Appendix B
WFNX Demographics
Age
|
Audience
Composition
|
|
18-44 |
98% |
|
18-34 |
82% |
|
21-34 |
68% |
|
25-34 |
52% |
|
Gender |
WFNX |
Market |
Marital Status |
WFNX |
Market |
|
Male |
53% |
48% |
Single |
60% |
29% |
|
Female |
47% |
52% |
Married/ Divorced |
40% |
71% |
|
|
WFNX |
MARKET |
COMP. RANK |
|
|
|
|
|
Occupation
White Collar Professional/Managerial Exec./Admin./Managerial |
63% 33% 16% |
46% 24% 11% |
2 3 3 |
|
Annual Household
Income Median $50,000 and over $100,000 and over |
$53,000 54% 13% |
$44,000 40% 9% |
2 2 4 |
Education College grad or more Post graduate |
43% 14% |
28% 12% |
3 5 |
Home Ownership Status Own home Median value of owned home Rent |
49% $181,000 51% |
66% $159,000 32% |
15 3 1 |
Personal Computing Household owns a computer Subscribes to an on-line service |
57% 14% |
45% 8% |
2 3 |
Entertainment & Recreation Bicycling In-line skating Jogging/running Hiking/back packing Snow skiing Aerobic workouts Live theatre Dance or ballet performances Boston Red Sox Boston Bruins Boston Celtics Rock Concerts Art Gallery/Museum Nightclub Attend movies (1+/Past 3 months) Belong to health/exercise club |
48% 15% 32% 33% 28% 33% 44% 19% 32% 17% 12% 53% 52% 58% 78% 29% |
34% 6% 17% 17% 16% 22% 38% 13% 20% 8% 8% 22% 33% 30% 58% 16% |
1 1 1 1 1 1 3 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 |
Report
based on adults 18+ in Boston Metro, Monday – Sunday 6am – Midnight (1995 Scarborough)
Appendix C
Year over Year Percentage Revenue Growth
Appendix D
Competitive Cume Duplication: Percentage of Listeners
Shared with WFNX
